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The Future is Femtech: Privacy and Data Security
Issues Surrounding Femtech Applications
Celia Rosas*

I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 2264 and the bracelet on your wrist flashes a white light.
You hardly flinch. In under twenty seconds, a small capsule dispenses
from a cylinder above your desk. You grab it without giving it much
thought. In it lies a pill and a small note. When you read the note, you are
reminded of a distant childhood memory of when your second-grade class
sampled a ‘Chinese fortune cookie’ as part of Interplanet History Day at
your virtual school. You vividly remember your excitement upon seeing
the fortune paper inside the cookie which was quickly met with confusion
as you read, “A good way to keep healthy is to eat more Chinese food.” 1
Food no longer exists. You are accustomed to only ingesting synthetic
tablets manufactured to specifically maintain your body’s vitals and
nutrient levels. This time, your note reads “ergocalciferol + ferrous
sulfate.” You realize your body must be experiencing vitamin D and iron
deficiencies in response to the hormonal imbalance caused by your
monthly cycle. You ingest the pill and the white light on your bracelet
turns off.
While the above futuristic scenario seems all too implausible,
emerging technologies addressing women’s health are on the rise. 2 Female
Technology, colloquially referred to as Femtech3 in the technology and
* Celia Rosas is a law student at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
She extends tremendous thanks to: Professor Jennifer Dunn for helpful comments; Alexander Bastian
and Maxwell Szabo for mentorship with policy drafting and the legislative process; and Anthony Isola
for feedback and support during the writing process.
1. Fortune Cookie Message Archive, FORTUNE COOKIE MESSAGE, http://www.fortunecookie
message.com/archive.php [perma.cc/3MFY-2T8B].
2. Berenice Magistretti, The rise of femtech: women, technology, and Trump, VENTURE BEAT
(Feb. 5, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/02/05/the-rise-of-femtech-women-technologyand-trump/ [perma.cc/LVA8-V78L].
3. The term “Femtech” was coined by Ida Tin, co-founder of the fertility-tracker Clue who states
on her blog, “an enormous range of technology innovations such as temperature patches, insertable
devices, wristbands, clip-ons, smart jewelry, DNA testing related to fertility and many other devices
and data analytics helping people figure out their female health . . . addressing female health needs
through technology: femtech.” Ida Tin, The Rise of a New Category: Femtech, CLUE (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://helloclue.com/articles/culture/rise-new-category-femtech [https://perma.cc/ECC8-JY89].
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health industry, is one of the largest growing sectors catching the eyes of
venture capitalists4 and entrepreneurs alike. What was largely an ignored
health area, is now a feeding ground for investors who realize the market
potential of Femtech5 because nearly half of the globe is female. 6 In 2015,
the digital health industry as a whole raised $5.8 billion from investors, $82
million of which was invested into nine Femtech companies. 7
Femtech is a term applied to a category of software, diagnostics,
products, and services that use technology to focus on women’s health. 8
The Femtech industry is comprised of digital or standard health tools
focusing on fertility solutions, period-tracking, pregnancy and nursing care,
women’s sexual wellness, and reproductive system health care. 9 Products
currently on the market range from Elvie’s pelvic-floor strengthening
device,10 to period-tracking apps like Clue 11 and Glow.12 The Femtech
industry also includes products like L.’s organic cotton tampons and
chemical-free, bioethical condoms. 13
Recall the futuristic yet-all-too-plausible scenario described at the
beginning of this introduction? A bracelet triggered the release of a pill to
assist the woman in regulating her health vitals. Such a technology can
only exist to the extent it analyzes the woman’s personal health status in
real time. While a bracelet that monitors and dispenses personalized health
vitamins has yet to launch, similar technologies regulating female health
are currently on the market. Many of the technologies available include a

4. Id.
5. Jill Richmond, The New Year Of Optimism For Femtech, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2016, 5:55 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillrichmond/2016/12/31/the-new-year-of-optimisim-forfemtech/#1f7d7dcc54c9 [perma.cc/BGF4-YUAP].
6. The World Bank estimates the female population is roughly 49.5 percent of the world’s total
population, based on age and sex distributions of UN World Population Prospect countries. THE
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS [perma.cc/4UBW-EFBM].
7. Richmond, supra note 5.
8. See generally Mona Fromm, The Femtech Revolution, HANDELSBLATT GLOBAL (Mar. 4,
2017, 2:00 PM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies-markets/the-femtech-revolution-713865
[perma.cc/Z23K-HNLZ]; see Heather Mack, Clue Gets $20M to Enhance Intelligence of PeriodTracking App, Grow Team, MOBIHEALTH NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/
content/clue-gets-20m-enhance-intelligence-period-tracking-app-grow-team [perma.cc/B4LQ-ZA65].
9. See generally Heather Mack, In-Depth: Digital Health Innovation In Fertility and Women’s
Health- Not So Niche Anymore, MOBIHEALTH NEWS (Dec.22, 2016), https://www.mobihealthnews.
com/content/depth-digital-health-innovation-fertility-and-womens-health-%E2%80%93-not-so-nicheanymore [perma.cc/3XPQ-H8M4].
10. Elivie Trainer, https://www.elvie.com/shop/elvie-trainer [perma.cc/4NHJ-XRSZ].
11. CLUE, https://www.helloclue.com/ [perma.cc/R46K-UVTD].
12. GLOW, https://glowing.com/ [perma.cc/4A2N-RG3A].
13. L., https://thisisl.com/ [perma.cc/2V54-NNJW].
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device synced to a companion mobile application14 or involve only the
singular use of a mobile application. 15 When a user first begins using the
device and companion mobile application, the user is prompted to input
personal information into the mobile application which can range from
name and age to more personal information like health history. The mobile
application is an integral feature of these health technologies because the
mobile application stores, analyzes, and provides the user with personalized
reports of her health status.
Of the most popular Femtech products currently on the market is the
Elvie Trainer. The Elvie Trainer, an “award-winning Kegel trainer for a
stronger pelvic floor” visualizes a woman’s pelvic floor movements in real
time and provides biofeedback accessible through a companion mobile
application16 to “strengthen [a woman’s] pelvic floor muscles for fewer
leaks within weeks.” 17 Typically, kegal strengthening includes “clenchand-release” exercises of pelvic floor muscles that improve or eliminate
bowel and bladder leakage. 18 Women who suffer from incontinence—the
inability to control one’s bladder resulting in urinary leaks—after giving
birth, often engage in pelvic floor strengthening exercises. 19 The Elvie
Trainer provides women with a more sophisticated and high-tech
alternative to targeting these muscles through its Elvie Trainer device and
companion mobile application.
To begin, a user simply needs to purchase the Elvie Trainer kegal and
register as a user on the Elvie mobile application. The user then turns the
kegal device on and places the small, silicone device inside her vagina.
She then connects to the mobile application to begin workouts that target
her pelvic floor muscles. Motion and force sensors are part of the device’s
design that sync with the mobile application to track the user’s progress

14. The Sonata Smart Breast Pump is a double-electric breast pump that pairs with a companion
application, the MyMedela app. Through the MyMedela app, users can directly access International
Board Certified Lactation Consultants and view statistical data collected from the breast pump device.
SONATA SMART BREAST P UMP, http://www.medelabreastfeedingus.com/products/905/sonata-smartbreast-pump#tabs-horizontal1 [perma.cc/59Y7-PGTT].
15. Clue is a fertility tracker application that operates without a companion device. Clue,
https://www.helloclue.com/ [perma.cc/R46K-UVTD]. The application relies on a user to provide
personal information and continually input information about her health and body including any periodrelated symptoms, descriptions of bodily fluids, or any changes she notices.
16. Elvie, https://www.elvie.com/shop/elvie-trainer.
17. Elvie, https://www.elvie.com/ [perma.cc/BJ5Y-BPD9].
18. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CONTINENCE, https://www.nafc.org/kegel/ [perma.cc/3WU5G2F4] [hereinafter NAFC].
19. WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/urinary-incontinence-oab/womens-guide/bladder-controlmenopause#1 [perma.cc/5SHN-FN3R].
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and provide her with personalized analytics. 20 The application allows the
user to freely provide personal data but personal data may also be collected
automatically when using the application. Personal data includes the user’s
name, contact information, geographic position and workout data. The
Privacy Policy detailed in the company’s Terms and Conditions makes
clear that “[f]ailure to provide certain Personal Data may make it
impossible for this Application to provide its services.” 21
Kindara, a fertility-tracking application offers to help a woman “[g]et
pregnant faster, avoid pregnancy naturally, or better understand [her] body
with the world’s most powerful and useful fertility charting system.”22 As
a fertility solution that can operate on analytics calculated solely through
the application, the application requires the user to input personal data at
the onset of use. Personal data includes details surrounding the user’s
cervical fluids, menstruation, sex and health-related history. Kindara’s
Privacy Policy acknowledges the sensitivity of some of this information
and advises the user to “choose carefully regarding whether and if [she]
will use the Service.”23
Glow, Inc., an ovulation and health-tracking application, boasts its
“powerful ability to crunch vast amounts of data to investigate the science
behind . . . menstruation, sex, fertility, pregnancy, parenthood, and
beyond.”24 The application indicates that “the more data [entered], the
more accurate [the] predictions.”25 Glow’s Privacy Policy states that
personal data such as name, gender, and contact information will be
collected at the onset of registration with the application. The Privacy
Policy also provides that the application will allow the user to input
individualized data which “include[s] sensitive personal data about
personal health issues and/or information related to . . . past, present, or
future physical or mental health condition[s].” 26 Importantly, and distinct
from the aforementioned health applications, Glow displays a HIPAA
Complaint notice on its website. 27
The significant commonality between the applications described
above and many others on the market, is the applications’ reliance on users’
personal health information. The disclosure and use of personal health
20. Id.
21. Terms and Conditions, Privacy Policy, Elvie Mobile Application (last updated Jan. 22, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/6VEN-2FUC], [perma.cc/488W-JRUG].
22. Kindara, https://www.kindara.com/ [perma.cc/6V5E-C7MG].
23. Kindara Terms of Use, KINDARA [perma.cc/VFR2-FPN9].
24. About Glow, G LOW, https://glowing.com/about [perma.cc/5SGA-R5UQ].
25. Glow, https://glowing.com/glow [perma.cc/GSA6-FBEU].
26. Glow Privacy Policy, GLOW, https://glowing.com/privacy [perma.cc/82FN-A98R].
27. Id.
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information is met with promises to better provide users with more accurate
personalized data. In effect, much of the personal health information stored
on these applications is collected freely and automatically because users are
encouraged to disclose such information. 28
Under HIPPA, “protected Health Information” (“PHI”)29 defines what
types of personal health information covered entities are required to
protect. The definition of PHI is a focal point for regulation of related
digital health information. A question of law exists as to whether the
personal health information collected, stored and used by Femtech
applications, should fall under the definition of PHI and consequentially be
subject to federal regulation and oversight. For the reasons set forth in this
paper, privacy and data security regulations concerning personal health
information must be amended to protect users of Femtech mobile
applications because current laws do not regulate Femtech mobile
applications.
Specifically, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) must be amended to minimize the potential
data and privacy risks associated with Femtech technologies.
II. THE PROBLEM−WHY FEMTECH PRODUCTS AND ITS LACK OF
REGULATION ARE OF GROWING CONCERN
Femtech companies who collect and store personal health data often
fall outside the purview of HIPAA.30 While subject to Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) regulations,31 Femtech companies are largely
left unregulated on a federal level as it pertains to privacy and data security
requirements regarding PHI. Of the emerging Femtech companies, most of
them do not fall under the Code of Federal Regulation’s definition of a
covered entity.32 This exposes Femtech application users to a myriad of
privacy and data security issues. Expansion of HIPAA’s covered entity
definition is of recent rhetoric33 as a greater number of mobile health
(“mHealth”) applications continue to emerge. 34 Proposed solutions include
28. See NAFC, supra note 18.
29. What is PHI?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/
hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html [perma.cc/Q3AQ-E4HJ].
30. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
32. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
33. See generally Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation of Mobile
Phone Health Applications, 40 AM. J.L & MED. 416 (2014); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory
Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143
(2017).
34. See Peter McLaughlin & Melissa Crespo, The Proliferation of Mobile Devices and Apps for
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a broad sweeping of mHealth applications under HIPAA’s covered entity
definition.35 However, such a broad proposal unnecessarily burdens all
Femtech mobile health companies, regardless of the technology invented or
the amount of personal health information collected and stored. Covered
entities must be redefined to include Femtech applications that are synced
to ‘biosensing products’ 36 and applications that provide similar analytics.
A distinction must be made between certain Femtech products and services
that analyze highly personal information often measured by body-invasive
devices and Femtech applications that offer simple tracking services. In
drawing this distinction, the regulations imposed on simple Femtech
applications will be lessened and allow such applications to more freely
enter the market because of the less stringent regulations that are in place.
Therefore, only sophisticated, high-tech devices and their companion
applications that collect personal health information will be subject to
HIPAA regulations.
However, HIPAA reform should not rely solely on expanding the
definition of HIPAA’s “covered entities” because such a solution does not
adequately address the implications of an ever-changing technological
landscape. Rather, reform should also focus on updating industry standards
as it relates to physical and technical safeguards mandated under HIPAA.
Specifically, encrypted data need not be a solution a company can elect to
comply with but, instead, be a required measure that Femtech and similar
mHealth applications must implement to ensure encrypted data becomes
the “commercially-reasonable standard.” This will ensure that technical
safeguard requirements under HIPAA more accurately reflect modern
technologies to better protect Femtech mobile application users.
A. CURRENT FEMTECH COMPANIES’ PRIVACY POLICIES ARE INADEQUATE AND
EXPOSE USERS TO POTENTIAL DATA BREACHES

The notion that consumers who voluntarily use products and services
are thereby impliedly consenting to the policies in place by such companies
is not novel.37 The FTC Act plays a large role in ensuring that consumers
Healthcare: Promises and Risks, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 21, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/
practitioner-contributions/the-proliferation-of-mobile-devices-and-apps-for-health-care-promises-andrisks/ [perma.cc/E27R-ZY8T].
35. Flaherty, supra note 33.
36. The term “biosensor” is short for “biological sensor” which is defined as “chemical sensing
device in which a biologically derived recognition is coupled to a transducer, to allow the quantitative
development of some complex biochemical parameter.” Sally Robertson, What are Biosensors? (Feb.
26, 2019) https://www.news-medical.net/health/What-are-Biosensors.aspx [perma.cc/4S3G-ZDX6].
37. This notion does not run afoul from the concept that policy terms must not be inconspicuous
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are made aware of company practices and acts, or at the very least, that
customers are not misled about deceptive practices. 38 Because current
Femtech mobile applications are unregulated, privacy and data security
practices are left to the discretion of the company.
Ava, for example, a fertility tracking bracelet and companion
application that offers insight about fertility, pregnancy and female health, 39
states the company has “implemented commercially reasonable procedural,
physical and technical safeguards to protect [a user’s] personal information
against loss, theft or alteration as well as unauthorized access and
disclosure.” 40 The Privacy Policy details its data storing and processing
practices which indicates that “information is stored and processed on
servers located in the [US], either by [Ava] or by a third party . . . such as
Amazon Web Services, or in any other country in which Ava or its service
providers may operate.” 41
Flo, a period tracking application that “uses artificial intelligence for
the most accurate menstrual cycle predictions,” 42 states it takes
“commercially reasonable measures to protect all collected information” 43
but further indicates that it “cannot guarantee the security of the
[application].”44 Unlike Ava, Flo’s Privacy Policy does not disclose the
company’s data storing and processing practices.
After a comparison of Ava, Flo, Elvie, Kindara, and Glow’s privacy
policies, it is apparent Glow is the only company with a privacy policy that
prominently identifies the company’s satisfactory HIPAA compliance. 45
Unlike the other companies, Glow is considered a “business associate”
under HIPAA’s covered entity definition because Glow offers users the
ability to elect into the “Glow Fertility Program Patient Services

and must provide the user with reasonable notice. See Vernon v. Qwest Communs. Int’l, Inc., 857 F.
Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (D. Colo. 2012).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
39. AVA, https://www.avawomen.com/ [perma.cc/CRJ3-5EU8].
40. Ava Privacy Policy, AVA, https://www.avawomen.com/privacy/ [perma.cc/WN26-BJJT].
41. Id.
42. FLO, https://flo.health [perma.cc/P934-WEJY].
43. Privacy Policy, F LO, https://flo.health/privacy-policy [perma.cc/44SY-RU29].
44. Id.
45. GLOW, https://glowing.com [perma.cc/GSA6-FBEU] (“HIPAA Compliant” emblem on the
bottom right of the homepage). HIPAA does not provide a certification indicating that a company or
organization is fully compliant. A “HIPAA” certification solely means that a person or persons of the
company have “successfully undergone a course designed to train and teach . . . the information . . .
[needed] to enable [a] business or organization to become HIPAA compliant.” HIPAA certifications are
issued by many online courses. HIPAA Compliance Tools, https://www.hipaacomp liance.org/hipaacertified/ [perma.cc/BQ3T-9XPC].
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Agreement” (“Fertility Program”).46 Glow’s Fertility Program enables
Glow to “act as a conduit between (a) health care providers offering
fertility-related services, [and] (b) other persons involved in the arranging,
provision or financing of health care services.”47 As “business associate,”
Glow is therefore required to comply with HIPAA. To comply with
HIPAA, Glow explicitly discloses that it “maintain[s] physical security
measures to guard against unauthorized access to systems and use[s]
safeguards such as firewalls and data encryption.”48 No other privacy
policy makes references to data encryption. 49
Although these case studies are merely a sample, they provide ample
color as to the commercially reasonable safeguards Femtech companies
choose to employ. Most often, encryption as a means of data security falls
wayside to other technical safeguards such as utilization of secure servers.
This is presumably attributed to cost and other extenuating circumstances. 50
The HIPAA Security Rule defines technical safeguards as “the technology
and the policy and procedures for its use that protect electronic protected
health information and control access to it.” 51 Covered entities may
essentially “use any security measure that allow [them] to reasonably and
appropriately implement the necessary standard for protection.” 52 Covered
entities are required to encrypt PHI during data transmission but can choose
the type of encryption and whether such data will remain encrypted
thereinafter.53 Femtech mobile applications, on the other hand, are free to
employ any security measure as the company so chooses—which includes
not implementing any sort of security measure.
Such lenient standards result in inadequate privacy and data security
protection for Femtech mobile users. A prime example of this problem is
Yahoo! Inc’s. (“Yahoo”) recent data breaches. As an e-mail and internet
service provider, Yahoo collects and stores individuals’ personal
information (much like Femtech mobile applications) ranging from an
individual’s contact information to credit card and social security

46. Privacy Policy, GLOW, https://glowing.com [perma.cc/82FN-A98R].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. This determination is made in reference to a blind sample I conducted of seven Femtech
Applications currently on the market.
50. Elizabeth Snell, HIPAA Technical Safeguards: A Basic Review, HEALTHIT SECURITY (Nov.
11, 2014), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/hipaa-technical-safeguards-basic-review [perma.cc/7D7TSWGX].
51. Snell, supra note 50; see generally, The Security Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [perma.cc/QDK2-B63W].
52. Snell, supra note 50.
53. Id.
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identification. An examination of Yahoo’s recent data breaches highlights
the catastrophic consequences to users’ privacy because of outdated
technical safeguards implemented under inadequate and lenient laws.
B. AN EXAMINATION OF YAHOO!, INC.’S UNENCRYPTED DATA BREACHES
ILLUSTRATES THAT POTENTIAL DATA BREACHES ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR AMONG
FEMTECH MOBILE APPLICATIONS.

In a putative class action against Defendant Yahoo, Plaintiffs alleged
because of Yahoo’s history of data security failure between 2014-2015,
Yahoo should have been put on notice (prior to the third data breach in
2016 that led to this lawsuit) of the need to enhance their data security. 54
Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Yahoo “fail[ed] to cryptographically
store the passwords in its database.” 55 Plaintiffs proffered evidence to
support Yahoo’s deliberate decision to not encrypt their user data, as former
Yahoo security staffers interviewed said requests made by Yahoo’s security
team for new tools and features, such as strengthened cryptography
protections were rejected on the grounds that the requests were too costly,
complicated, or were simply too low a priority. 56
This demonstrates the inherent tensions that arise when companies are
too free to decide the ways in which they will implement security
measures. While the Northern District Court of California has yet to issue
a final judgment on the merits, the parties have entered into a preliminary
settlement agreement in which the court relies on Plaintiffs’ expert Mary
Frantz’s 92-page report regarding Yahoo’s data security.57 “The report
shows repeated failures to follow industry-standard security practices,
extensive knowledge of ongoing security breaches beginning in 2008 with
failure to adequately respond, failure to provide adequate staffing and
training, and failure to comply with industry standard regulations.” 58 but if
the allegations are true, issues surrounding the efficacy of companies’
privacy and data security policies are of harrowing concern.
54. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
the case has yet to proceed to adjudication on the merits of the case.
55. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL
3727318, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017).
56. Id. at *2.
57. As of March 3, 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division denied the parties’ preliminary class action settlement agreement. In re Yahoo! Inc.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2019 WL 387322,*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
2019).
58. Id.
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Of noteworthy mention is at the time the Yahoo breaches took place,
Yahoo’s Privacy Policy stated the company adopted “commercially
reasonable standards,” similar to the privacy policies of current Femtech
applications.59 This indicates that either Yahoo failed to meet modern
commercially reasonable standards or that industry-wide, commercially
reasonable standards are insufficient guarantees of security, and therefore,
the industry as a whole needs stricter regulations. Publicly available
company privacy policies therefore present a myriad of issues surrounding
the validity, efficacy and veracity of company privacy practices.
Companies must be held accountable for failure to comply with industry
standard regulations and evermore, for flagrantly disregarding such
standards.
The Femtech industry faces impending data breaches similar to that of
Yahoo’s. With the rise of Femtech technology, comes an even greater risk
of industry-wide privacy and data protection issues. 60 Femtech companies
adopt commercially reasonable standards when it comes to privacy and
data security. But by current law, Femtech mobile applications are left
unregulated because the laws in place are constructed in such a way that
Femtech companies need not comply with any sort of security or data
privacy requirements. There is no legal requirement for companies to
implement updated and adequate privacy and data safeguards nor is there
any recourse for companies that fail to adopt “commercially reasonable
standards.” Therefore, stricter privacy and data security regulations
surrounding PHI are necessary now more than ever, specifically as it
relates to Femtech mobile applications.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
IS INADEQUATE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ADDRESS PHI AS
IT RELATES TO FEMTECH MOBILE APPLICATIONS
Much of the problem surrounding Femtech privacy and data security
issues pertains to the fact that the personal health information collected,
stored, and analyzed by Femtech mobile applications qualifies as PHI yet is
unregulated. Protected Health Information is defined in Title 45 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Section 160.103 as “individually identifiable
health. . . that is transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic

59. In re Yahoo!, 2017 WL 3727318 at *2.
60. Steven Roosa, A Deep Dive into the Privacy and Security Risks for Health, Wellness, and
Medical Apps, IAPP (Apr. 6, 2015) https://iapp.org/news/a/a-deep-dive-into-the-privacy-and-securityrisks-for-health-wellness-and-medical-apps/ [perma.cc/G7EF-LE74].
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media; or transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.” 61
“Individually identifiable health information” is
[I]nformation that is a subset of health information, including
demographic information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is
created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and (i) That
identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the
individual.62

Simply stated, PHI is “personally identifiable information in medical
records, including conversations between doctors and nurses about
treatments . . . [and] also includes billing information and any patientidentifiable information in a health insurance company’s computer
system.” 63
Femtech mobile applications encourage users to input their health
history into the applications to provide more accurate analytics. Some
applications encourage users to voluntarily input similar information that is
listed in a patient’s medical records. Due to the nature of the data collected
and analyzed, the application monitors a user’s health status to the same
extent a physician or gynecologist would. In effect, the Femtech mobile
applications and medical records often contain the same level of personal
health information.
The right to privacy covers patients’ medical records by requiring
physicians and similar personnel to protect patients’ personal health
information from being disclosed or stolen. 64 Much of the intent
surrounding a physician’s duty to ensuring that a patient’s medical records
remains confidential stems from the Hippocratic Oath.65 However, as
technology advances and various mobile applications provide users with
similar health metrics and analysis, so too should Femtech mobile
applications be subject to similar duties of confidentiality. Therefore,
61. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
62. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
63. What is Protected Health Information (PHI)?, TRUE VAULT https://www.truevault.com/
protected-health-information.html [perma.cc/S8A4-5XME].
64. See generally 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014).
65. Mark A. Rothstein, The Hippocratic Bargain and Health Information Technology, J.L. &
MED. ETHICS (Spring 2010).
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Femtech mobile applications that collect, store, and analyze users’ personal
health information should be subject to PHI regulations under Title 45 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 160.103.
Accordingly, Femtech mobile applications should be subjected to
similar laws that regulate PHI. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)66 and the Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTC Act”)67 regulate PHI and health information to varying degrees.
Thus, HIPAA and the FTC Act should regulate Femtech mobile
applications as well.
A.

HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

HIPAA is a federal law that promulgates regulation of PHI by setting
forth compliance requirements for data privacy and security purposes. 68 It
was enacted in 1996 in response to patients’ inherent privacy concerns
following the medical care industry’s digitization of medical records. 69
When enacted, the legislature solely addressed the prospect of healthcare
providers, clearinghouses and intermediaries accessing patients’ PHI, and
therefore HIPAA’s scope was narrowly tailored. 70 HIPAA only regulates
and applies to specific entities referred to as “Covered Entities.”71
Covered Entities72 includes three categories of persons or entities that
fall under the purview of HIPAA: healthcare providers or health care plans,
clearinghouses, and business associates. 73
Examples of healthcare
providers and health plans include physicians, clinics, nursing homes,
health insurance companies, HMOs, and Medicaid and Medicare. 74
Clearinghouses include entities that process nonstandard health information
received by another entity into a standard electronic format. 75 Examples of
clearinghouses include payment systems and technology infrastructures. 76
66. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
68. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014).
69. The History of HIPAA & The Consequences of a HIPAA Violation, RECORD NATIONS,
https://www.recordnations.com/articles/history-hipaa/ [perma.cc/TB5W-CRBW].
70. Jamie Lynn Flaherty, Digital Diagnosis: Privacy and the Regulation of Mobile Phone Health
Applications, 40 AM J.L & MED. 416, 423−24 (2014).
71. 45 C.F.R § 160 (2014).
72. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
73. Id.
74. Are You a Covered Entity?, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES https://www.
cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAA-ACA/AreYouaCovered
Entity.html [perma.cc/A6UD-BS4K].
75. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
76. Are You a Covered Entity?, supra note 74.
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Business associates refers to “a person or entity that performs certain
functions involving the use or disclosure of PHI on behalf of, or provides
services to, a covered entity.” 77 Examples of business associates include a
CPA firm whose accounting services to a health care provider involve
access to [PHI] 78 or an “independent medical transcriptionist that provides
transcription services to a physician.” 79 Only those persons or entities
falling under the statute’s definition of a covered entity” must comply with
HIPAA regulations.80
In general, Femtech mobile applications do not fall under HIPAA’s
definition of a covered entity. Hence, Femtech mobile applications need
not comply with HIPAA regulations. Femtech mobile applications do not
fall under the first category of “physician or health care provider” because
the applications are not operated by physicians or health care providers.
Most Femtech companies are independent companies that create
specialized technologies to serve a niche demographic—like women
seeking to get pregnant naturally and without the use of in-vitro
fertilization or hormones, or women addressing issues of incontinence
through pelvic floor strengthening. Femtech mobile applications do not fall
under the second category of “clearing houses” because they are neither
payment systems nor technology infrastructures. HIPAA’s business
associate category is the only potential category that could sweep a
Femtech mobile application under HIPAA regulation. However, Femtech
companies tend to find ways to avoid such categorization.
For the most part, Femtech companies function independently from
physicians or health care providers and restrict the disclosure of the
information collected by the application. Some company policies state,
however, that in the event a user chooses to disclose the information
collected, stored, and analyzed by the application, the company will not be
responsible for transmitting nor disclosing any information to a third-party,
such as a physician. Such a restriction severs any cross-functioning between
the Femtech mobile application and a physician or healthcare provider. This
subsequently allows the company to skirt around HIPAA requirements.
Arguably the most important provisions of HIPAA’s requirements are
embodied in the HIPAA Administrative Simplifications Regulations. 81
77. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014).
78. Business Associates, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html [perma.cc/3P8R-NQSV].
79. Are You a Covered Entity?, supra note 74.
80. 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2017). See Flaherty, supra note 70 at 416; Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory
Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 143
(2017).
81. Flaherty, supra note 70 at 416.
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HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Breach Notification Rule
outline parameters for PHI disclosure and safeguards that a covered entity
must implement, 82 establish patient rights pertaining to their PHI records, 83
and provide notice requirements for breaches of PHI. 84
The Privacy Rule “sets national standards for when [PHI] may be used
and disclosed.” 85
Generally, disclosure of PHI requires patient
86
authorization. In limited situations, disclosure without authorization may
be permitted.87 The Privacy Rule also establishes rights that a patient may
exercise to examine PHI records, obtain a paper trail of where the patient’s
PHI has been sent, and to request corrections. 88
The Security Rule “requires appropriate administrative, physical and
technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and security of
electronic protected health information.” 89 To meet this requirement,
covered entities must “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of
the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronic protected health information.” 90 An entity may
then be required to implement physical 91 or technical92 safeguards to ensure
the protection of PHI. One technical safeguard addressed in the Security
Rule is the implementation of encryption.93 While not a required
safeguard, “the encryption implementation specification is addressable, and
must therefore be implemented if, after a risk assessment, the entity has
determined that the specification is a reasonable and appropriate safeguard
in its risk management of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of

82. Id.; see also The Security Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/security/index.html [perma.cc/QUS6-752S].
83. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/index.html [perma.cc/AEK7-PDTR].
84. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules https://www.
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads
/HIPAAPrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf [perma.cc/PPC9-3B3K].
85. Id.
86. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/index.html [perma.cc/AEK7-PDTR].
87. Instances of required disclosures absent authorization include when the U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services is undertaking a compliance investigation or review or enforcement action.
Id.
88. HIPPA Privacy Rule, supra note 83.
89. HHS, The Security Rule, Health Information Privacy https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-prof
essionals/security/index.html [perma.cc/A64P-JDPQ].
90. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(II)(A) (2017).
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (a)(2)(ii) (2017).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1) (2017).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2017).
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[PHI].”94 An entity may choose to not implement a specification after a
risk assessment but must document that determination and implement an
equivalent alternative measure to meet the safeguard standard (and include
documentation of the rationale for this decision). 95
The Breach Notification Rule “requires covered entities to notify
affected individuals, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
(“HHS”), and in some cases, the media, of a breach of unsecured PHI. 96
Breach notification obligations differ depending on the number of
individuals affected by the breach. 97 Breach notifications must be provided
without unreasonable delay. 98 Such a requirement would ensure that
Femtech policies provide users with the necessary notices and affirmative
action necessary after a breach. Kindara’s Privacy Policy, for example,
merely indicates that the company “may attempt to notify [a user or] . . .
may post a notice on the Website or the App” 99 in the event of a data
breach. Users who do not live in a jurisdiction that otherwise provides
them with the legal right to receive written notice of a data breach must
notify the company to elect such protection.100 The Breach Notification
Rule requirements would resolve problematic breach notification policies
that are currently in place by Femtech companies.
The Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Breach Notification Rule are
effectively meaningless as they relate to Femtech mobile applications
because Femtech companies fall outside HIPPA’s purview. The most
important of the three rules that pertains the Femtech mobile applications is
the Security Rule. Data breaches of highly sensitive personal health
information collected, stored, and analyzed by these applications should be
a top of mind concern for users. However, as Femtech companies are not
required to implement any specific security and data protection technical

94. FAQ, Health Information Privacy, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2001/isthe-use-of-encryption-mandatory-in-the-security-rule/index.html [perma.cc/PN3D-D6LB]; 45 C.F.R. §
164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2017); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(ii) (2017).
95. Id.
96. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules https://www.
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/HIPA
APrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf [perma.cc/X6PE-GJQE].
97. 45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a) (2017) (“[f]or a breach of unsecured protected health information
involving more than 500 residents of a State or jurisdiction, a covered entity shall, following the
discovery of the breach as provided in § 164.404(a)(2), notify prominent media outlets serving the State
or jurisdiction”).
98. HIPAA Basics For Providers: Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules, https://www.
cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/HIPA
APrivacyandSecurityTextOnly.pdf.
99. Privacy Policy, KINDARA, https://www.kindara.com/privacy-policy [perma.cc/6PWM-C5ZF].
100. Id.
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safeguards, Femtech mobile application users face a high risk of data theft.
B.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT (“FTC ACT”)

The FTC also promulgates regulation of health information by
prohibiting companies from engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.” 101 Specific to companies who collect
and use personal health information, companies may not mislead
consumers about the companies’ privacy and data security policies as it
relates to collected and used personal health information. 102 The FTC Act
establishes disclosure and notice requirements regarding a company’s
practices thereby promoting the access of information consumers have in
relation to the use of their health information. 103 One way a health
company can comply with the FTC Act is by not burying key facts in a
privacy policy, terms of use, or HIPAA authorization form. 104 Compliance
with the FTC Act can also be met by informing the consumer about the full
scope of how personal health information can or will be used prior to the
consumer making a material decision to send or disclose personal
information.105 Companies required to abide by the FTC Act requirements
may not be subject to HIPAA compliance and vice versa.
While the FTC Act serves an important purpose by mandating that
companies fully inform users of company policies, the FTC Act does not
regulate the manners, mechanisms, and means of how a company’s
technological infrastructure must operate to ensure consumer’s privacy
rights are upheld. For example, the FTC Act does not outline the
parameters of technological safeguards a company must implement to
ensure privacy and data security remains optimal. The FTC Act, therefore,
does not adequately address the risks of privacy and data breaches among
Femtech mobile applications.
C. SOLUTION: HIPAA MUST BE FURTHER REFORMED TO REDEFINE “COVERED
ENTITIES” AND REQUIRE COMPANIES TO IMPLEMENT ENCRYPTION AS A TECHNICAL
SAFEGUARD.

Many of the risks posed by Femtech mobile application privacy and
101. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
102. Sharing Consumer Health Information? Look to HIPAA and the FTC Act, FED. TRADE
COMM’N https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/sharing-consumer-health-informa
tion-look-hipaa-ftc-act [perma.cc/WT9G-VAAB].
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2017).
104. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 102.
105. Id.
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data security issues can be addressed by expanding the definition of
“covered entities” under HIPAA and by specifying certain technical
safeguard requirements codified in the Security Rule.
i. HIPAA’s Covered Entities Definition Should Include Femtech Applications
Synced with Biosensing Devices.

Recent proposals for HIPAA reform call for a broad sweeping of
mHealth applications, which would include Femtech applications, under
the covered entity umbrella. However, such expansion would deter
innovation and entry of Femtech and mHealth applications from entering
the market. For example, simple, inexpensive applications such as steptrackers and food-log applications would be subjected to meeting an
unnecessarily high, technical safeguard threshold. Instead, Femtech
applications should be categorized into two distinct groups: (1) biosensing
devices synced with companion applications and (2) general health
trackers. Covered entities should be expanded to include the former
because of the highly sensitive information collected and analyzed by such
products.
Biosensors are devices that convert biological recognition element
into a signal output. 106 Biosensing technologies allow for continuous
physiological monitoring in a wide range of products.107 Biosensing
products include those like Ava, the fertility tracking bracelet, and more
commonly, blood glucose biosensors for people with diabetes or other
related health issues. Other biosensing products that will soon enter the
market include NextGen Jane’s “smart tampon.” 108 This smart tampon will
use biosensors to collect and analyze a woman’s biological changes
predictive of disease. The device will also be able to screen a woman for
sexually transmitted infections.109 Similar to current Femtech products like
the Elvie Trainer, NextGen Jane’s ‘smart tampon’ and other biosensing
products rely on the devices’ biosensors to monitor personal health
information. Their companion applications likewise store and analyze
users’ personal data that is collected.
These sorts of applications differ from traditional health trackers that
merely log the number of steps a person takes in a day. The food a person
eats at each meal would hardly constitute personal health information in
106. Malay Gandhi & Teresa Wang, The Future of Biosensing Wearables, ROCK HEALTH,
https://rockhealth.com/reports/the-future-of-biosensing-wearables/ [perma.cc/S35Y-2AQY].
107. Id.
108. NextGen Jane, http://www.nextgenjane.com/ [perma.cc/A33H-UG8Q].
109. Id.
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comparison to the metrics offered by a smart tampon. Traditional health
logs do not store and analyze a high volume of personal data to the extent
emerging biosensing products do. 110 By identifying this stark difference,
regulation can better address the inherent privacy concerns among users of
these two groups of Femtech applications. In turn, applications with lowprivacy concerns would not need to implement technical safeguards like
data encryption. This will then allow these applications to better succeed
on the market because they will not need to expend resources to implement
technical safeguards. Due to the advanced technology inherent in
biosensing devices, it is not unreasonable to require that sophisticated
products implement technical safeguards like data encryption.
States are looking to adopt privacy and data security legislation as a
means to regulate emerging technologies because of the very reason that
with the advent of sophisticated technologies comes the inherent
expectation that heavier regulations will be imposed. 111 For example,
Illinois and Texas have adopted state laws that regulate employers who
collect biometric data from their employees. 112 This is in response to
emerging technologies that are replacing traditional clock-in methods using
time-stamp cards by replacing it with biometric identification. Biometric
data includes identifying information from a person’s fingerprint,
voiceprint, or the scan of a person’s retina, iris, face or hand. 113
Specifically, Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”),114
requires employers who collect biometric data to implement physical and
technical safeguards pertaining to the collection, retention, and destruction
of such information. While the cost of such safeguards is of relevance,
state and federal legislatures anticipate the growth of technology and
understand the risks that such growth poses without adequate legislative
oversight.115 Requiring employers—who wish to utilize, collect and store
biometric data—to comply with BIPA regulations is of a similar essence to
requiring Femtech companies—who wish to collect and store personal
110. See generally 7 Wearables That Go Beyond Fitness Trackers and Smart Watches ELYSIUM
HEALTH (Mar. 31, 2018), https://endpoints.elysiumhealth.com/next-generation-wearables-2018-b0c8be
461151 [perma.cc/7LT6-VZTV].
111. Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017
10:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/ [perma.cc/6K
9P-MT2E].
112. Jay Hux, Collecting Employee Biometric Data Could Prove Costly in Illinois, Society for
Human Resource Management, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Sept. 19, 2017) https://www.
shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-updates/Pages/Collecting-Employ
ee-Biometric-Data-Could-Prove-Costly-in-Illinois.aspx [perma.cc/68TC-TREU].
113. Id.
114. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15 (2017).
115. Hux, supra note 112.
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health information—to comply with HIPAA regulations.
Employees have already begun to rely on BIPA regulations to ensure
that companies who capture, collect, and store, employees’ biometric data
fully comply with recent laws that are in place. 116 United Airlines became
one of the latest companies hit with a putative class action in November
2017 for failure to comply with BIPA regulations. United Airlines
employees alleged the company failed “to inform workers in writing that
their biometric data was being captured, collected, and stored.” 117 Further,
the plaintiffs allege that the biometric clocking systems that United Airlines
has implemented puts the workers at great risk of data theft. 118 Many of
these concerns mirror those of Femtech mobile users face because
companies who choose to capture, collect, store, or analyze users’ personal
information put users at a high risk of data theft. The putative class action
against United Airlines is another example of why companies must be held
to a higher standard to ensure that privacy and data security risks are
mitigated. Regulatory compliance provides users with adequate protection.
ii. The Accessibility of Encryption Software Merits Its Requirement under HIPAA.

While expanding the definition of “covered entity” is of paramount
importance, the effects of HIPAA can only be of value if adequate security
requirements are likewise adopted and enforced.
Specifically, in
addressing data breach concerns similar to those of Yahoo’s, HIPAA must
be amended to require that biosensing devices and companion mobile
applications implement encrypted data.
In its current form, the HIPAA Security Rule allows companies to
implement various technical safeguards to protect PHI but does not
mandate that companies encrypt collected data.119 The Security Rule
impliedly acknowledges the vast array of privacy and data security issues a
specific company may face but the Security Rule was implemented at a
time when certain technological safeguards were costly or viewed as
extraneous.120 However, technological solutions now exist that can enable
every mHealth and Femtech application to meet HIPAA requirements
through data encryption software.

116. Hannah Mansiel, United Airlines Latest to be Sued Under Illinois Biometric Law, LAW360
(Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.law360.com/articles/983384/ [perma.cc/EZN2-GKVA].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Snell, supra note 50.
120. Id.
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Technology platforms, such as Aptible 121 and Amazon Web Services
(“AWS”),122 enable companies to more easily implement modernized
technical safeguards, like cryptography. Aptible is specifically on a
mission to bring companies in full HIPAA compliance by helping
companies builds private, secure software systems. The company’s goals
are to transform the experience of digital health engineers and application
developers while reducing the costs and impediments typically associated
with integrating data encryption software. 123
Amazon Web Services provides extensive cloud computing services
including data protection and storage. Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3)
allows a company to encrypt data either through server-side encryption or
client-side encryption. This data protection includes in-transit and at-rest
protection. An AWS user can select its desired services and thereby only
needs to pay for whichever individual product it uses. This enables a
company to customize its technology infrastructure and provides a
company with inexpensive encryption options. 124
The existence of these technologies, juxtaposed with the lack of
Femtech companies’ utilization of such technologies, illustrates the
unwilling nature of companies to freely implement available safeguards.
This exemplifies the trend of unregulated industries who typically take the
less costly and more profitable approach at the expense of user
protection.125 As was the case with the telecommunications industry, only
through regulation can technological safeguard standards be raised industry
wide.126 The Smartphone Bill is a prime example of such regulation. 127
In 2014, San Francisco District Attorney George Gascon and New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman introduced a smartphone “killswitch” bill in response to the rise of smartphone theft. The bill required
smartphone manufacturers to implement a “kill-switch” in every device
that would render the device inoperable if stolen. At the time, the killswitch, an anti-theft technology, existed but was not integrated on every

121. APTIBLE, https://www.aptible.com [perma.cc/4EDB-KXJM].
122. AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/ [perma.cc/C2H2-AS6Z].
123. APTIBLE, supra note 121.
124. AMAZON, supra note 122.
125. George Skelton, Smartphone “Kill Switch” Bill Mugged by Telecom Industry, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-cap-kill-switch-20140501-column.html
[perma.cc/88RD-F7E8].
126. Ellen Huet, As California Kill-Switch Law Takes Effect, Smartphone Theft Already Down
32%, FORBES (July 1, 2015) https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/as-california-kill-swit
ch-laws-takes-effect-smartphone-theft-already-down-32/#719021ad641f [perma.cc/H5PG-HW2R].
127. Id.
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device or if it was integrated, required the user to opt-in.128 The
telecommunications industry adamantly opposed such technology claiming
it was unnecessary and an undue burden on manufacturers. However, once
major telecommunications companies’ hidden financial incentives were
exposed, the Smartphone Bill eventually passed and mandated that all
smartphones and tablets manufactured after July 2015 come equipped with
a kill-switch.129 Reports indicate a substantial decline in smartphone theft
in recent years attributed to the passage of this bill.130
Similar outcomes can be expected by requiring Femtech and mHealth
applications to use data encryption. But an important distinction exists
between telecommunications manufacturing companies and Femtech
companies: financial stability. Telecommunications companies were
required to implement kill-switches because the technology existed and the
purported financial burdens caused by such implementation were of low
and questionable concern. Telecommunications companies feared a loss in
revenue sales because cellphone users would no longer need to buy brand
new smartphones every time theirs were stolen. Furthermore, there was
minimal concern addressing these companies’ increased expenditures on
the actual implementation of the anti-theft technology. However, a
financial concern does exist regarding Femtech and health companies’
integration of encrypted data. Many of these companies are start-ups that
do not have the financial prowess like that of AT&T, Sprint, and Apple. In
order to promote prosperous innovation, Femtech and mHealth companies
must not be stifled by undue financial burdens.
To address this concern, the law must find a fine balance between
protecting users’ personal health information and promoting innovation.
The distinction between the information collected by two Femtech
categories, biosensing devices and their companion mobile applications and
simple tracking applications, balances these interests. Such a distinction
best serves femtech companies’ financial interests while furthering
innovation because as companies develop and rely on highly-advanced
biosensing devices, in congruence with companion applications, the
information collected is inherently more comprehensive and personal.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to require high-tech companies who
collect, store and use highly-sensitive personal information to implement
high-tech safeguards. Thus, I propose, that to resolve mobile health
applications' privacy and data security concerns, the law must require
128. Id.
129. Katy Steinmetz, Kill Switches on Smartphones Now Mandatory in California, TIME (Aug. 25,
2014), http://time.com/3178077/kill-switch-smartphones-mandatory-california/ [perma.cc/R2R8-364J].
130. Huet, supra note 126.
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sophisticated Femtech companies to implement cryptography.

IV. CONCLUSION
An underlying concern addressed by requiring certain Femtech
applications to implement technical safeguards such as encryption is the
proposition advanced by Moore’s Law. 131 Moore’s Law, an axiom in the
computing industry, provides that technology will double every two
years.132 Recent innovations in the Femtech and mHealth industry illustrate
the accuracy of this axiom. With the speed of technological advancements
comes the even greater need for reform to combat the risks posed by such
technology. Technology regulations are not intended to stifle technological
advancements and achievements but rather provide guidelines that foster
technological growth. Regulations should be viewed as imperative because
there is little use in a technology that poses exponential risks that outweigh
any benefits derived from use of the technology.
In response to TrumpCare proposals, the health industry is creating
technology that outweighs the risks of conservative proposals that leaves
millions of Americans without adequate care.133 Through the use of
Femtech devices, the health industry is shifting and patients are taking
health matters into their own hands, 134 figuratively and literally. Femtech
and mHealth applications enable users to receive health care from the
comfort of their own homes, without the intervention of a physician or
health care provider. But as the health industry shifts from physicianfocused care to technologies that enable patients to self-monitor their
health, duties of confidentiality likewise shift. A patient’s right to privacy
and a physician’s duty to keep her digital health records confidential is an
extension of the Hippocratic Oath. 135 The Femtech and mHealth companies
need to be held to similar, if not the same, standards and should be
accountable for protecting users’ privacy and data information.
To ensure that Femtech and mHealth companies are held to higher
standards, these companies must be regulated. Likewise, Femtech mobile
application users need adequate legal protection to rely on when companies

131. Hux, supra note 106.
132. Id.; MOORE’S LAW, http://www.mooreslaw.org/ [perma.cc/J5K5-8NZE].
133. Magistretti, supra note 2.
134. Id.
135. See generally Rothstein, supra note 65; Hippocratic Oath, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hippocratic-oath [perma.cc/6JMQ-QK4J]; The Hippocratic Oath,
PBS (Mar. 27, 2001) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html [perma.cc/DL
A9-ZWZ9].

Summer 2019

THE FUTURE IS FEMTECH

341

fail to protect their personal health information. As technology continues
to advance and the metrics provided by these Femtech companies becomes
of greater societal value, personal health information should continue to be
appropriately protected. By expanding the definition of “covered entities”
and requiring encryption as a means of ensuring technical safeguards are
up-to-date, HIPAA will better serve users of Femtech mobile applications
to ensure users receive the necessary protection that pertains to security and
data privacy.
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